EDITORIAL NOTE
As this Comment goes to print, Governor Cahill has signed into
law a new Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, No.
A-2544, (Dec. 7, 1971); ch. 336, [1971] N.J. Laws -, which specifically
repeals N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:58-38 et seq. (Supp. 1971-72). See notes
137-42 and text at 84-85 supra.
The new law contains two provisions which grant aid to nonpublic
schools in two different manners:
(1) Providing of supplies, instructional materials, equipment and
auxiliary services by the State to nonpublic schools with guidelines
to be established by the State Board of Education and ownership
of these items remaining in the Board;
(2) Reimbursement of parents for money spent during the school
year on secular, non-ideological textbooks, instructional materials
and supplies in the amount of $10 per year for each child in kindergarten through the eighth grade and $20 for each child in high
school.
The first provision attempts to employ the Tilton rationale for the
benefit of elementary and high schools. This factor creates one difficulty with the provision since the Court in Tilton was of the opinion
that the fact that aid was going to colleges rather than secondary schools
was significant. The Act is also careful to retain ownership of the supplies in the State, but the relationship set up seems to be one of a more
continuing nature rather than the "one-time single purpose grant" in
Tilton. Finally, and most importantly, the character of the items granted
to the schools is significantly different. The geographical separation
possible with nonsecular buildings such as auditoriums and gymnasiums is not attainable with the unsupervised purchase of supplies and
instructional materials to be employed in the teaching of substantive
courses.
The second provision raises even more interesting questions. A direct grant to parents seems to avoid the entanglement question since that
issue applies to direct state-institution relationships. The Court in
Lemon, however, pointed out that scrutiny of the entanglement question precluded consideration of the primary effect test. The converse
would be the result if the New Jersey Act was challenged. A reviewing
court would not be distracted by the entanglement question and would
probably evaluate this provision directly on the basis of the older cases
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of Schempp and Allen. A heavy burden would be placed upon the State
to illustrate that the provision's primary effect is not the advancement
of religion. The secular goal of the provisions is also somewhat suspect.
Final determination as to the Act's constitutionality, however, awaits
further Supreme Court action in the area.

